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WHEAT BUFFER STOCKS AND TRADE IN AN EFFICIENT 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
ABSTRACT 
This study assesses storage and trade of wheat in an integrated global economy. 
Domestic and international linkages are analyzed using a dynamic rational expectations model 
of the world wheat market. The results of this study demonstrate the importance of 
endogenizing both storage and trade in studying commodity markets. Results suggest an optimal 
US buffer stock level of 150 million bushel. Results indicate that past government stockholdings 
have not followed efficient market outcomes. Private markets likely would perform better in 
the absence of government market distortions. Results indicate that elimination of the Export 
Enhancement Program by the US and of export restitution payments by the EU is unlikely to 
have a major impact on wheat exports from the two regions, but will save millions of tax dollars 
in both regions. 
WHEAT BUFFER STOCKS AND TRADE IN AN EFFICIENT 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), United 
States (US) farm bills (1985, 1990), and European Union (EU) MacSherry reforms are steering 
the world wheat market towards greater reliance on market forces. Major grain producing 
countries including Argentina, Australia, and Canada are liberalizing trade and implementing 
market-oriented farm policies. These global, regional, and domestic policy reforms have 
promoted freer movement of goods and services, and have made world economies more 
interdependent. 
Global equilibrium trade models can be used to analyze trade flows among regions under 
the new regime, but most are not dynamic and fail to reflect the role of storage in smoothing 
trade flows (Bailey; Bigman and Reutlinger; Johnson et al.; Makki et al.; Roningen; Tyers and 
Anderson, 1992). Trade is not necessarily a "one shot game" as assumed by static trade models. 
With storage possible, the amount traded depends not only on current consumption and 
production but also on past and expected future consumption and production. The modem 
theory of storage provides a detailed assessment of domestic market dynamics. However, it fails 
to endogenize trade flows among countries (Gustafson; Miranda and Glauber; Miranda and 
Heimberger; Wright and Williams). 
An increasingly interdependent and commercial world food market calls for an assessment 
of world wheat market (WWM) within a framework combining both storage and trade. Storage 
and trade are alternative means to smooth domestic prices and consumption in the face of 
unstable domestic production. In an integrated global market storage and trade respond 
simultaneously to food and feed shortage or surplus and to policy changes. Therefore, storage 
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and trade flows from one country cannot be deduced independently of storage and trade in 
another country. 
Relatively few nations account for a dominant share of the WWM exports and buffer 
stockholdings. The US and the EU together account for just over 50 percent of world exports, 
over 30 percent of world wheat stocks, and for an even larger percent of wheat buffer stocks. 
The present study analyzes the WWM dominated by the US and the EU in the context of the 
post Uruguay Round of the GATT. We estimate storage and trade rules for an efficient market 
operating under competitive conditions in the absence of commodity program and trade 
distortions. Domestic and international linkages in buffer stocks and trade are investigated using 
a dynamic rational expectations model of the WWM. Results of this study establish an efficient-
market benchmark for wheat trade and buffer stocks in the US and the EU. 
THE MARKET MODEL 
This section presents a "three-region" world wheat market consisting of two net 
exporters, the US and the EU, and one net importer, the combined rest-of-the-world (hereafter 
referred to as RW). Trade is assumed to occur between exporters and the importer, with no 
trade between the two exporters. For ease of exposition, the model is presented in two parts. 
The first part presents the model for exporters, while the second part presents the model for 
RW. 
Exporters 
The following conceptual model outlines market characteristics of the two exporting 
entities, the US and EU. The framework of supply, demand, and arbitrage conditions are 
similar between the US and the EU. 
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Material Balance. The available supply in country i in period t (~i) is composed of 
current production (Qti) plus the carryover from the last period ( S1~ 1). The country must allocate 
Ati among consumption (C/), storage (Sti), and exports (Xti). The resulting intertemporal 
equilibrium is summarized in the following material balance equation: 
(1) 
The state variable Ati reflects the state of the economy, which summarizes all the relevant past 
and current information. This specification assumes no losses in storage and no qualitative 
differences between the stored commodity and the freshly harvested commodity. 
Consumption Demand. Current consumption, feed, and seed use in country i (Cti) is a 
downward sloping function of current market price (P/) : 
(2) C i = i(P i)ai 
t a t ' V i == US,EU 
where ai > 0 is the constant term and Bi < 0 is the price elasticity of demand. Consumption of 
wheat in the US and the EU is assumed to be non-stochastic and consumers' income is assumed 
to be constant in both regions1• 
Production. The current production in country i (Qti) equals the acreage planted in the 
preceding year (Lt~l) times a random yield per acre (Yti) : 
(3) 
1 Even if income changed over time and the income elasticity were included in the demand function, 
the effects would not be large because of the low income elasticity of demand for wheat consumption in 
both the US and the EU. 
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The acreage planted by rational producers in country i (4i) depends on the price expected to 
(4) L i - i [E pi ]111 
t - a * t t+l ' 't/ i = US,EU , 
where ai > 0 is the constant term and fli > 0 is the price elasticity of supply in country i. 
Yield is assumed to be random with a known probability distribution. The yield distribution is 
independently and identically distributed through time and across space. That is, neither serial 
correlation in yield within the region nor contemporaneous correlation in yields across regions 
is present. 
Storage. Storage is carried out by expected profit maximizing arbitragers. Competition 
among the risk-neutral stock holders eliminates speculative profits, yielding the following inter-
temporal arbitrage condition2: 
(5) 't/ i = US,EU 
where oi = (1 +ri)-1 is the annual discount factor when the annual interest rate is ri, E (Pi ) 
t t+l 
is the expectation of p1~ 1 , conditional on the information available in period t, and ki(S1i) is the 
marginal cost of storage. The intertemporal arbitrage condition (5) implies that, at the margin, 
the expected gain from holding an additional unit of stock is equal to the cost of holding it. 
Economic profit gained from stockholding is presumed to cause individuals and firms to pursue 
2 If there are efficient futures markets, then risk attitudes of stockholders will not affect their 
stockholding behavior. Risk attitude will affect only their positions in the futures market, not their 
storage behavior. Growing evidence that risk premiums are small in futures markets allows risk 
neutrality as a reasonable assumption (Frankel; Miranda and Heimberger; Williams and Wright) 
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additional storage. This decreases expected gains and increases marginal costs, bringing 
equilibrium between marginal benefits and marginal costs. 
The discount rate represents the opportunity cost of funds tied up in holding stocks. 
Storage costs, on the other hand, include cost of handling, the rental value of storage space, and 
insurance against theft or damage. The marginal cost of storage is specified as an increasing 
function of amount stored: 
(6) V i = US,EU 
where k1 and k2 are parameters. This specification of the marginal cost function allows for a 
convenience yield to storage, which represents the amount commodity processors are willing to 
pay to have a stable supply (Brennan; Kaldor; Working,1948, 1949)3• Figure 1 depicts the 
marginal cost-of-storage function. In times of short supplies, the current price (PJ may exceed 
the discounted expected price for the next year (ot EtPt+l) such that there may not be any 
incentive for speculative carryout. When this occurs, processors will still hold contingency or 
working stocks to smooth production and avoid unnecessary adjustment costs. 
International Trade. International trade is undertaken by private traders who exploit 
spatial arbitrage profit opportunities. Competition among such traders eliminates excess 
arbitrage profits. Net exports from country i (Xti) to RW are a function of the market prices 
in both the regions, per unit shipping costs (f), and the per unit export subsidy provided by the 
government (gi). Trade is subject to the following spatial arbitrage condition: 
3 A more general condition is when stocks are held at less than full carrying charges, which Working 
termed a negative price of storage. 
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Storage 
Figure 1. Supply of Storage 
(7) i . . pt + 't'l - gl = 
Equation (7) says that, if the buying cost plus shipping cost less government subsidy exceeds the 
selling price in RW, then no trade will take place. This also implies that trade takes place in 
one direction only, from either the US or the EU to RW. 
Rest of the World 
Rest-of-the-world is assumed to be a large consumer with no significant buffer stock 
holdings. It is assumed to represent the world wheat import market where the US and the EU 
compete to sell wheat. RW is represented by a stochastic net demand function. 
Consumption Demand. Current consumption in the rest of the world (C,.rw) is a function 
of current market price (Pt rN) : 
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(8) 
where the random variable utrw is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance cl. The process of random shocks is independently and identically distributed. 
Expression (8) is a net demand function. The random component, therefore, accounts for 
variation coming from both the supply and the demand side. 
Market Clearing Condition. The model is closed by assuming the following market 
clearing condition: 
(9) X us xeu crw t + t = t , 
where the sum of exports from the US and the EU is equal to total consumption in the rest of 
the world. 
Model Parameterization 
The specific parameters presented in Table 1 are representative of the US, the EU, and 
RW wheat sectors. Econometric studies indicate that the price elasticity of domestic demand for 
wheat in the two exporting regions is approximately -0.2 (Bailey; Gardner; Reutlinger; Rojko 
et al.; Sarris and Freebaim; Sullivan et al.; Tyers and Anderson, 1986). The price elasticities 
of demand for major importers, as listed in Sullivan et al., are as follows: -0.40 for North 
Africa, Middle East, and Southeast Asia; -0.25 for former Soviet Union; -0.10 for China; and-
0.25 for the rest of the world. For the present study, the price elasticity of demand for RW is 
estimated to be -0.31, which is a weighted average of major importers. 
Wheat supply elasticity estimates for the US and the EU reported in the literature vary 
widely. Sarris and Freebairn estimated a short-run wheat supply elasticity of0.2 for the US and 
Table 1. Model Parameters 
Price elasticity of demand 
Constant term for demand function 
Price elasticity of supply 
Constant term for supply function 
Yield (bu per acre) 
CV of yieldb (%) 
Shipping cost ($ per bushel) 
Annual interest rate (%) 
Storage function parameters: kl 
TheUS 
-0.20 
6.40 
0.30 
0.04 
40.00 
10.00 
0.50 
7.00 
0.40 
TheEU 
-0.20 
10.40 
0.30 
0.03 
66.00 
10.00 
0.50 
7.00 
0.40 
RW 
-0.31 
36.00 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
k2 0.20 0.20 a 
aNot relevant for RW; SCV is coefficient of variation obtained by dividing 
standard deviation by mean. 
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0.35 for the EU; while OECD estimates were 0.5 and 0.46, respectively for the US and the EU. 
In the present study, a supply elasticity of 0.3 is assumed for both the US and the EU. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate results under alternative demand and supply 
elasticity estimates. The constant terms for demand and supply functions were derived using 
1989-93 average price and consumption and are presented in Table 1. The random yields both 
in the US and the EU are assumed to follow a log-normal distribution with an estimated mean 
of 40 and 66 bushels per acre, respectively, and an identical coefficient of variation (CV) of 10 
percent4• 
4 CV is standard deviation divided by mean. The estimated CV s of yield for the period 1980-93 
were respectively 8.5 and 12 percent for the US and the EU. Tweeten and Ray et al. also report similar 
variance levels for the US and the EU, respectively. 
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Choosing the appropriate interest rate is crucial because it represents the opportunity cost 
of holding stocks. Competitive stockholders must receive a rate of return on their activity at 
least equal to their opportunity cost. Malkeil, after an extensive review of the financial 
literature, concluded that the real rate of return on long-term assets in the US is about 10 
percent. This rate of return, however, cannot be directly used as the relevant rate of interest. 
Gardner (p. 126) suggested that the appropriate discount rate must reflect a post-tax rate of 
return5• Assuming a tax rate of 30 percent, the appropriate rate of interest is estimated to be 
7 percent. In the present study, 7 percent is used as the real rate of interest in both regions. 
Storage cost function parameters are chosen such that the non-interest cost of storage lies 
near 10 percent of the price during normal production. International shipping costs are assumed 
to be $0.50 per bushel, which is approximately equal to 12.5 percent of the current price of 
$4.00 per bushel (FAO predicts average shipping costs to be 10 to 15 percent of the price). 
Export subsidies range from $0.40 to $0.60 per bushel (US GAO). Similar parameter estimates 
are assumed in the EU. The random shock variable ut in the RW demand function is assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 0 .1. 
Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibria 
The goal here is to solve the market model (1) through (9) for the equilibrium functions 
of price, storage, exports, and acreage for the given set of parameters. Producers and 
stockholders, whose current actions are based on future prices, are assumed to be rational in the 
sense of Muth. The rational expectations hypothesis implies that rational agents make forecasts 
s Gardner's formula is as follows: r = R(l-t)- :P, where r is the relevant nominal interest rate, R 
is the pretax nominal rate of return, t is the tax rate, and P is the rate of inflation. In the present study, 
however, R is real rate of return and, therefore, the inflation factor is ignored. 
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consistent with those of the underlying economic model, use all available information efficiently 
in making decisions, and do not make systematic errors. The rational expectations hypothesis 
establishes a connection between the beliefs of individual agents and the actual stochastic 
behavior of the system. The forecasts generated by this process will then be equal to the 
expectations that appear in the model. In this sense expectations are internally consistent with 
the model (Sheffrin)6• Solving a rational expectations model, thus, involves fmding an 
equilibrium stochastic process for all the endogenous variables. 
The structural model developed in this study asserts that prices are related to conditional 
expectations. For example, if it was predicted that prices would rise by 10 percent by the end 
of the year, stockholders would accumulate stocks until the expected marginal returns from 
holding stocks equates the cost of storage. Thus no patterns established from past behavior can 
ever be used to predict future price behavior. The study uses stochastic dynamic programming 
to solve for the equilibrium stochastic process of endogenous variables. The inability of storage 
to be negative introduces a nonlinearity into the system requiring numerical methods to solve the 
modeJ1. 
The Chebychev orthogonal polynomial projection and collocation method is used to solve 
for the competitive equilibrium conditions (Judd, 1991, 1992; Miranda; Miranda and Glauber). 
The polynomial projection method is motivated by the Weirstrass approximation theorem, which 
6 Adaptive expectations, for example, suggest that the price expected for period t is a weighted 
average of the price obtained in period t-1 and the price expected for period t-1. Adaptive expectations 
are, therefore, backward looking in forming expected prices and hence subject to time inconsistency 
problems (Kydland and Prescott; Blanchard and Fisher). 
7 The impossibility of carrying forward negative stocks imposes a non-negativity constraint on stocks, 
which has been an important feature of more recent literature on commodity storage (Miranda and 
Glauber; Miranda and Heimberger; Williams and Wright). 
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shows that a smooth function can be approximated to any level of accuracy using a polynomial 
of sufficiently high degree. This method replaces the infinite-dimension functional equation 
problem with a finite dimensional nonlinear algebraic equation root-finding problem such that 
equations (1) through (9) are required to hold exactly at only finitely-many points. The expected 
price functions, which generally lack known closed form expressions, are approximated using 
a sequence of chebychev polynomials. Conditional expectations, which also lack known closed 
form expressions, are computed using Gaussian quadrature. The equilibrium functions are 
computed by successive approximation and the steady state mean and coefficient of variation are 
estimated from samples of 100,000 observations generated through Monte Carlo simulations. 
For any given regime, the model is simulated by repeatedly drawing random yields in the US 
and the EU and random shocks for the RW demand from the respective assumed distributions. 
For details see Makki. 
STORAGE-TRADE INTERDEPENDENCE 
The introduction of storage into a trade model alters the relationship between supply and 
demand, and, hence, the equilibrium price. The dynamic rational expectations model explicitly 
recognizes that the market as a whole cannot carry negative stocks, thus introducing nonlinearity 
in the supply-storage relationship. This nonlinearity extends itself to price-quantity relationships 
shown with and without storage in Figure 2. The nonlinearity in the price-quantity relationship 
occurs at the point at which storage first occurs (Au). The figure indicates that endogenizing 
storage in a trade model augments the demand curve and makes price less sensitive to quantity 
changes. 
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Price Functions for US Wheat With (I) and Without (II) 
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The steady-state distributions of price and consumption were also different in the absence 
of storage (Table 2). For example, with no storage possible, the CV of price was 35 percent 
compared to 20 percent when storage is endogenous. The CV of consumption was also lower 
with storage (3 percent) than without storage (7 percent). Thus, storage helps to stabilize both 
price and consumption. 
Another result, evident from Table 2, is that the CV of price in the importing region RW 
is lower with storage (17 percent) compared to no storage (30 percent) in the two exporting 
countries. Results also indicate that RW consumers, on average, pay more when no storage is 
undertaken in the two exporting countries. The CV of consumption in RW was 5 percent with 
storage and 10 percent without storage. Thus storage in exporting countries provides an 
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Table 2. Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of Price, Consumption, 
Storage, Exports, Acreage, and Production With and Without Storage 
Region 
us 
EU 
RW 
Variables 
Price ($/bu) 
Consumption (mil. bu) 
Storage (mil. bu) 
Exports (mil. bu) 
Acreage (mil. acre) 
Production (mil. bu) 
Price ($/bu) 
Consumption (mil. bu) 
Storage (mil. bu) 
Exports (mil. bu) 
Acreage (mil. acre) 
Production (mil. bu) 
Price ($/bu) 
Consumption (mil. bu) 
Note: ns. No storage. 
With Storage 
.................................................................... 
Mean 
3.38 
1256.76 
148.93 
1177.32 
60.50 
2437.91 
3.38 
1301.76 
148.93 
1046.80 
38.89 
2350.99 
3.88 
2224.13 
CV(%) 
19.57 
3.40 
80.43 
17.51 
1.03 
12.15 
19.57 
3.40 
80.43 
19.37 
1.02 
12.20 
17.05 
4.89 
Without Storage 
uoooooooooouuoouoo•••••••o•oooooohu••••oouooouuoudOooo•Ooooooo 
Mean 
3.44 
1264.93 
ns 
1187.02 
60.89 
2453.66 
3.44 
1310.22 
ns 
1056.15 
39.15 
2366.18 
3.94 
2243.19 
CV(%) 
34.85 
6.89 
ns 
19.49 
2.31 
12.01 
34.85 
6.89 
ns 
21.27 
2.01 
12.06 
30.43 
9.85 
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externality in the form of more stable consumption and lower and more stable prices for 
importers. 
Competitive Storage 
Total stockholdings in an economy can be divided into three types: (i) Buffer stocks are 
held to provide for contingencies (precautionary motive) and to take advantage of unforseen 
(speculative) opportunities to make profits; (ii) seasonal stocks are generally held to smooth 
consumption from one harvest to the next; and (iii) pipeline stocks are held by distributors of 
the commodity in transit, in processing, and on store shelves. The present study estimates only 
buffer stockholdings. Seasonal and pipeline stocks have little impact on market behavior in the 
long-run and hence are not analyzed in this study. However, pipeline stocks must be added to 
buffer stocks shown herein in comparing actual with efficient market year-end carryover 
stocks8 • 
Table 2 suggests an efficient buffer stock level of 150 million bushels in the US if the 
CV of production is 10 percent and discount factor is 7 percent in both the US and in the EU. 
This level will change depending on the domestic and foreign level of production instability, 
interest rates, and government commodity programs. For example, a US-EU coefficient of 
variation of production of 15 percent with zero discount rate calls for US wheat buffer stocks 
of 262 million bushels - a figure close to actual numbers from 1991 to 1994 if pipeline stocks 
are included. Gardner in his analysis of US wheat market indicated that in a free market with 
no government storage, the private sector, on average, would hold a speculative stock level of 
180 million bushels of wheat. Other studies including Taylor and Talpaz and Tweeten et al. 
8 Tweeten estimated a pipeline stock level of 250 million bushels of wheat in the US in 1991-92. 
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have reported larger buffer stocks for the US. These studies, however, did not account for 
storage-trade interdependence and possible tradeoffs. 
Figure 3 indicates the competitive equilibrium storage levels for the US under alternative 
supply levels in the EU. This relationship, generally referred to as a "rule" in the commodity 
storage literature, explains the functional relationship between economic states and equilibrium 
levels of stocks. For example, the competitive storage rule indicates that, with a beginning 
supply in the US of 2.6 billion bushels, a profit maximizing, rational competitive US storage 
industry would hold 167 million bushels in buffer stocks when the available supply in the EU 
is 2.4 billion bushels and would hold 303 million bushels when the available supply in the EU 
is 2.8 billion bushels (Figure 3). If the beginning supply in the US were 3.0 billion bushels, 
competitive stockholding would be 303 and 445 million bushels, respectively for the above levels 
of supplies in the EU. These rules indicate that the buffer stock in the US increases as the 
available supply in the EU rises. Thus stockholdings in the US and the EU are interdependent. 
Higher levels of supply in the EU reduce the current price in both the regions, which in tum 
induces rational stockholders to accumulate stocks in both regions9• 
The expected equilibrium storage levels generated by this model approximate the optimal 
level of stockholdings in a well functioning economy. These results represent the behavior of 
private stockholders maximizing profit or a public stockholding agency minimizing deadweight 
loss to the economy. The generated rules, therefore, provide the benchmark for both public and 
private buffer stock operations. 
9 In the present study equilibrium stock levels in the US and the EU are simultaneously determined. 
If the EU were to hold stocks autonomously, then the rational stockholders in the US would decrease 
their stock:holdings when the EU increases its stock level and vice versa. 
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Competitive Trade 
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Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium wheat exports from the US under alternative supply levels 
in the EU. In contrast to equilibrium storage functions, the equilibrium export functions shift 
downward (exports decline) with a larger EU supply. A larger EU supply diminishes US 
exports and raises US stocks, ceteris paribus. Thus buffer stocks and exports are substitutes 
when the market is open and efficient. 
In conclusion, our findings indicate that equilibrium levels of trade are sensitive to the 
presence of storage. Having demonstrated the significance of storage-trade interdependence in 
commodity markets, we now examine how storage and trade respond to policy changes. 
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STORAGE-TRADE RESPONSE TO A REDUCTION IN EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
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The US government introduced the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in 1985 to 
stabilize and increase exports, and to reduce record stock levels accumulated during the early 
1980s. The EEP was a counteroffensive strategy to hold market share by countering EU export 
subsidies. Under the program, government-owned surplus agricultural commodities were made 
available as bonuses to US exporters to enable them to lower export prices of US agricultural 
commodities and make them competitive with subsidized foreign exports, particularly those 
subsidized by the EU (US GAO). 
Since its inception in 1985 through March 1994, over $6.3 billion of US agricultural 
coinmodities have been made available as bonuses to eligible US exports. Nearly 80% of the 
EEP budget supported wheat sales during those years. The EEP subsidy during the entire period 
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was estimated to average $0.50 per bushel (US GAO). In the case of the EU, restitution 
payments to exporters make up the difference between the intervention price and the world price. 
The net effect of the export restitution payments is assumed to be similar to that of the EEP. 
According to the recently signed GATT agreement, the quantity of subsidized exports is 
to be cut by 21 percent, and export subsidy value is to be reduced by 36 percent over the next 
s1x years. The wheat subsidy is expected to fall to $0 20 per bushel when the GATT agreement 
is fully implemented. Table 3 reports the steady state mean and CV of price, consumption, 
storage, exports, acreage, and production of wheat in response to a partial, a unilateral, and a 
multilateral removal of the EEP and EU export restitution payments. Table 4 presents the 
estimated economic benefits/losses from such policy shifts. A 36 percent reduction in export 
subsidies in both regions is predicted to have only a modest impact on US exports because the 
US and the EU liberalizations tend to offset each other. The simulated results show that US 
wheat exports fall by 14 million bushels or 1.2 percent, while wheat stocks rise by 2 million 
bushels or 1. 2 percent (Table 3). US export revenue is expected to fall by $110 million but the 
predicted savings from a reduced EEP budget would be $219 million (Table 4). US consumers 
would gain ($78 million) while producers would lose ($160 million) due to partial liberalization. 
The GATT agreement, therefore, would save the US economy $136 million10 • 
What if the EU adheres to the GATT requirements of 36 percent reduction in export 
subsidies and the US unilaterally removes all export subsidies? Unilateral elimination of export 
subsidies by the US would decrease its exports by 4 percent and increase its stocks by 4 percent 
10 Results and policy implications for the EU are analogous to that of the US and hence not explicitly 
discussed to save space. 
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Table 3. Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV} of Price, Consumption, Storage, Exports, Acreage, and Production of 
Wheat Under Alternative Export Subsidy Policies of the US and the EU 
Current Policy" Partialb Unilateralc Multilaterald 
............................................................... . ................................. u........................ ............................................................. .. ........................................................... 
Variables Mean CV(%) Mean CV(%) Mean CV(%) Mean CV(%) 
TheUS 
Price ($/bu) 3.51 18.54 3.46 18.93 3.35 19.76 3.38 19.57 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1246.52 3.24 1250.29 3.30 1258.72 3.42 1256.76 3.40 
Storage (mil. bu) 144.31 81.02 146.04 80.82 149.79 80.30 148.93 80.43 
Exports (mil. bu) 1215.97 17.26 1201.66 17.35 1170.00 17.55 1177.32 17.51 
Acreage (mil. acre) 61.22 1.01 60.95 1.01 60.37 1.00 60.50 1.03 
Production (mil. bu) 2466.83 12.13 2456.09 12.04 2432.45 12.15 2437.91 12.15 
TheEU 
Price ($/bu) 3.51 18.55 3.46 18.93 3.48 18.76 3.38 19.57 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1291.15 3.24 1295.06 3.29 1293.34 3.27 1301.76 3.40 
Storage (mil. bu) 144.31 81.02 146.04 80.81 145.28 80.92 148.93 80.43 
Exports (mil. bu) 1084.79 19.01 1070.72 19.14 1076.92 19.08 1046.80 19.37 
Acreage (mil. acre) 39.36 1.01 39.18 1.01 39.26 1.01 38.89 1.02 
Production (mil. bu) 2378.88 12.18 2368.53 12.18 2373.08 12.18 2350.99 12.20 
RW 
Price ($/bu) 3.51 18.54 3.74 17.99 3.76 17.76 3.88 17.05 
Consumption (mil. bu) 2300.78 5.30 2272.39 5.15 2246.92 5.01 2224.13 4.89 
•current policy uses an export subsidy of $0.50 per bushel in both regions; bBoth the US and EU cut export subsidy value by 36%; 
cThe US unilaterally eliminates the EEP and the EU cuts export subsidy value by 36%; dNo export subsidies in either region. 
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Table 4. Expected Economic Gains/Losses from Removing Export Subsidies (in million dollars) 
Partial a Unilateralb Multilateralc 
us 
Consumer Surplus + 77.92 + 251.83 + 204.11 
Producer Surplus 
- 160.50 - 509.86 - 418.44 
Taxpayers Savings + 218 87 + 607.98 + 607.98 
Net National Gain + 136.29 + 349 95 + 393.65 
EU 
Consumer Surplus + 83.23 + 49.85 + 218.03 
Producer Surplus - 154 75 - 91.55 - 403.52 
Taxpayers Savings + 195.26 + 195.26 + 542.40 
Net National Gain + 123.74 + 153.56 + 356.91 
RW 
Consumer Surplus - 1331.80 - 1430.49 - 2087.91 
3Both the US and the EU cut export subsidy value by 36 percent. 
'The US unilaterally eliminates the EEP and the EU cuts export subsidy value by 36 percent. 
cNo export subsidies in either region. 
from the current policy (Table 3). US wheat prices would fall by 16 cents per bushel or 5 
percent while consumption would increase by 12 million bushels or 1 percent. Unilateral 
removal of export subsidies would benefit consumers ($252 million) and cost producers ($51 0 
million). But it would save the US economy $350 million (Table 4). 
Results show that multilateral elimination of export subsidies would decrease US exports 
by 3 percent and increase wheat stocks by 3 percent (Table 3). The difference between results 
from unilateral versus multilateral removal of export subsidies is small. Results also indicate 
that the domestic price of wheat would decrease by 4 percent while consumption would increase 
by 1 percent after the subsidies are completely eliminated. The world price is predicted to rise 
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slightly and become less volatile. These findings are consistent with some of the previous 
literature examining the efficacy of EEP (Bailey and Houck; Brooks, Devadoss and Meyers; 
Seitzinger and Paarlberg). Bailey and Houck, using a dynamic nonspatial equilibrium model of 
world wheat market, indicated that the EEP plays a minor role in expanding US exports. 
Seitzinger and Paarlberg attributed 2 to 3 percent expansion in exports to the EEP. 
Table 4 shows that producers are less worse off with multilateral compared to unilateral 
policy change. Unilateral more than multilateral elimination of all export subsidies dampens the 
domestic price. The net benefit to the US economy from multilateral removal of export 
subsidies is estimated to be $394 million. Results also show the inefficiency of the EEP. Each 
EEP dollar increases US exports by only $0.50. Thus deficiency payments paid directly to 
producers are more cost-effective than export subsidies in raising farm income. 
The foregoing analysis reveals the dynamic response of storage and trade to the EEP and 
EU restitution payments in the face of changing market conditions. The results suggest that 
elimination of export subsidies will not have a major impact on world wheat trade but will save 
millions of dollars for taxpayers. 
STORAGE-TRADE RESPONSE TO INTEREST RATES 
This section examines the impact of changes in real interest rates (discount rates) on 
storage and trade. The discount rate accounts for the risk and opportunity cost of holding 
stocks. For a given level of supply, private storage will tend to be larger the lower the discount 
rate. High discount rates constrain private sector stock holding. 
Table 5 reports the steady-state properties of selected endogenous variables for different 
interest rates. Results show that the steady-state storage in the US decreased by 29 million 
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bushels or 19 percent when the interest rate increased from 7 to 10 percent. When the storage 
level decreases the market becomes more volatile. The CV of prices increased by 2 percentage 
points in all three regions in response to an increase in interest rate from 7 to 10 percent. The 
CV of consumption, however, changes little. Consumption in both the US and the EU declined 
by a million bushel each, while consumption in RW increased by 2 million bushels. The small 
changes in mean and CV of consumption is because of low elasticity of demand for wheat in the 
US and in the EU. US wheat exports increased by a million bushel in response to an increase 
in interest rate from 7 to 10 percent. 
Figure 5 graphs the steady state mean stocks in the US for different interest rates. The 
propensity to hold buffer stocks decreases as the interest rate increases. Mean stocks decreased 
from 225 million bushels to 120 million bushels in response to an increase in the interest rate 
from zero to 10 percent in the US and EU. Lower stock levels increase market price volatility. 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the world interest rate and the CV of US wheat prices. 
The CV of price increased from 15 percent to 22 percent in response to an increase in the 
interest rate from zero to 10 percent in all regions of the world. 
Underlying discount factors can differ between public and private storage, chiefly due 
to the differences in opportunity costs of capital and risks involved in maintaining stocks. The 
discount factor is lower for public stocks because the public sector can spread its risks over time, 
over many investments, and over the entire taxpaying population such that each citizen would 
bear only a negligible share of the total risk. Private stockholders require higher rates of return 
to compensate for high perceived risks of stockholding. Private stockholders are likely to pay 
higher interest rates on borrowed funds and often face attractive alternative investment 
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Table 5. Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of Price, Consumption, Storage, 
Exports, Acreage, and Production of Wheat Under Alternative Interest Rates• 
Interest Rates 
3 percent 7 percent 10 percent 
......................................................... .................................................. .. ............................................. 
Variables Mean cv (%) Mean cv (%) Mean cv (%) 
us 
Price ($/bu) 3.37 17.19 3.38 19.57 3.39 21.64 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1256.04 3.01 1256.76 3.40 1257.45 3.74 
Storage (mil. bu) 188.93 70.81 148.93 80.43 119.92 89.81 
Exports (mil. bu) 1176.30 17.30 1177.32 17.50 1178.15 17.70 
Acreage (mil. ac) 60.48 0.91 60.50 1.03 60.53 1.11 
Production (mil. ac) 2436.95 12.15 2437.91 12.15 2439.05 12.14 
EU 
Price ($/bu) 3.37 17.19 3.38 19.57 3.38 21.64 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1301.02 3.01 1301.76 3.40 1302.48 3.74 
Storage (mil. bu) 188.93 70.81 148.93 80.43 119.92 89.81 
Exports (mil. bu) 1046.00 19.20 1046.80 19.37 1047.65 19.52 
Acreage (mil. bu) 38.88 0.89 38.89 1.02 38.91 1.11 
Production (mil. bu) 2350.07 12.20 2350.99 12.20 2352.09 12.19 
RW 
Price ($/bu) 3.87 14.97 3.88 17.05 3.88 18.86 
Consumption (mil. bu) 2222.32 4.34 2224.13 4.89 2225.82 5.39 
alnterest rates are equal and change simultaneously in all regions. 
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opportunities. Hence the lower public discount rate justifies holding more stocks than would the 
private sector. However, the potential social gain from public stockholdings must be balanced 
against the shortcomings of public stocks. The public sector may mismanage stocks as evident 
from excessive grain stocks gathered by US commodity programs in past years. 
Assuming an interest rate of 3 percent for the public sector, the estimated efficient stock 
level was 189 million bushels, or about 27 percent higher than stocks held solely by the 
competitive market at an interest rate of 7 percent (Table 5). Private stockholding may also be 
reduced by the prospect of unpredictable government intervention in markets in response to 
political pressures. 
Table 6 illustrates how increases in interest rates in one country affect equilibrium price, 
consumption, storage, exports, acreage, and production in all regions. This analysis assesses 
the impact of increases in the interest rates in the US in 1994 and 1995, ceteris paribus. Results 
indicate that buffer stocks in the US decrease by 31 percent, while stocks in the EU increase by 
12 percent when the interest rate in the US is increased from 7 to 10 percent, holding the 
interest rate in the EU steady at 7 percent. Results suggest that for every bushel decrease in US 
stocks, the EU will increase its stockholdings by 0.4 bushels. 
Figure 7 graphically illustrates the shifts in equilibrium storage rules in response to 
increases in US interest rates. The figure shows that equilibrium stocks shift downward in the 
US and upward in the EU when interest rates in the US alone increase. US interest rate hikes 
restrain holding of buffer stocks and increase the volatility of commodity markets. Grain stocks 
in the EU increase to compensate for less US stocks. The impact of higher US interest rates on 
price and other variables is small. 
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Table 6. Impact of Higher US Interest Rates on World Wheat Markee 
Interest Rates 
8 percentb 9 percent 10 percent 
......................................................... . ................................................. . ................................................. 
Variables Mean cv (%) Mean cv (%) Mean cv (%) 
us 
Price ($/bu) 3.37 19.93 3.38 20.25 3.38 20.52 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1256.88 3.45 1256.99 3.50 1257.09 3.55 
Storage (mil. bu) 132.18 82.39 117.00 84.26 103.27 86.07 
Exports (mil. bu) 1177.61 17.69 1177.87 17.91 1178.11 18.15 
Acreage (mil. ac) 60.51 1.01 60.51 1.01 60.52 1.01 
Production (mil. ac) 2438.10 12.15 2438.28 12.15 2438.45 12.14 
EU 
Price ($/bu) 3.38 19.93 3.38 20.25 3.38 20.52 
Consumption (mil. bu) 1301.86 3.45 1301.95 3.51 1302.04 3.55 
Storage (mil. bu) 155.21 81.50 161.30 82.50 167.15 83.43 
Exports (mil. bu) 1046.78 19.31 1046.78 19.30 1047.60 19.32 
Acreage (mil. bu) 38.90 1.01 38.90 1.01 38.90 1.01 
Production (mil. bu) 2351.17 12.20 2351.34 12.20 2351.51 12.19 
RW 
Price ($/bu) 3.88 17.36 3.88 17.64 3.88 17.88 
Consumption (mil. bu) 2224.41 4.98 2224.66 5.05 2224.88 5.11 
•Interest rate changes only in the US; interest rate in the EU is held steady at 7 percent. 
bfor base period (7 percent interest rate) refer to Table 5. 
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PARAMETER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
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Sensitivity analysis of equilibrium model parameters is critical for establishing the 
robustness of model results. Demand and supply elasticities are key parameters and hence are 
of special concern. In the following simulations demand and supply elasticities for the US and 
the EU are changed jointly while the elasticity of demand in RW is held constant at -0.31. 
Table 7 summarizes the steady state properties of price, consumption, storage, exports, acreage, 
and production under different demand and supply elasticities. The selected elasticities range 
from -0.1 to -0.4 for demand and 0.1 to 1.0 for supply. 
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Sensitivity to Elasticity of Demand 
The higher the price elasticity of demand, the lower the marginal propensity to hold 
stocks. This is because a more elastic or relatively flat demand curve causes price to be less 
sensitive to changes in supply, reducing the incentive for holding stocks. With an elastic 
demand, consumers absorb most of the variation in production by adjusting their consumption, 
making price stability provided by storage less necessary. 
Table 7 indicates that storage is relatively more sensitive than are other endogenous 
variables to changes in demand elasticities. For example, mean storage decreased from 156 
million bushels to 124 million bushels or 21 percent in response to an absolute value increase 
in elasticity from -0.1 to -0.4. The CV of stocks increased from 79 percent to 82 percent for 
a similar increase in the elasticity of demand. 
The results indicate that US exports increased by 50 million bushels or 4 percent when 
the elasticity of demand increased from -0.1 to -0.4 (Table 7). The changes in the CV of 
exports were small. 
As expected, the higher the price elasticity of demand the smaller the domestic price 
instability. For example, the CV of price decreased from 21 percent to 15 percent in response 
to an increase in demand elasticity from -0.1 to -0.4 (Table 7). The CV of consumption in the 
US, on the other hand, increased modestly (from 3 to 5 percent) for a similar increase in 
demand elasticity. 
These simulations indicate that the model results are relatively robust to changes in the 
elasticity of demand. In general, the magnitude of change in simulated results for changes in 
price elasticity of demand was small. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity to Demand and Supply Elasticities: Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of Price, Consumption, 
Storage, Exports, Acreage, and Production of Wheat in the usa 
Price Consumption Storage Exports Acreage Production 
($/bu) (mil. bu) (mil. bu) (mil. bu) (mil. acre) (mil. bu) 
Demand Elasticity 
-0.1 Mean 3.36 1258.02 156.35 1170.67 60.71 2412.14 
cv (%) 21.26 2.76 79.06 17.41 0.70 12.18 
-0.2 Mean 3.38 1256.76 148.93 1177.32 60.50 2437.91 
cv (%) 19.57 3.40 80.43 17.50 1.01 12.15 
-0.3 Mean 3.22 1179.81 134.22 1220.62 59.65 2403.40 
cv (%) 16.76 4.51 81.03 16.64 1.01 12.11 
-0.4 Mean 3.27 1191.39 124.11 1220.24 59.93 2414.69 
cv (%) 14.81 5.39 81.65 16.62 1.01 12.09 
Supply Elasticity 
0.1 Mean 3.65 1236.88 149.39 1146.52 59.22 2386.32 
cv (%) 21.63 3.78 78.04 17.47 0.91 12.04 
0.3 Mean 3.38 1256.76 148.93 1177.32 60.50 2437.91 
cv (%) 19.57 3.40 80.43 17.50 1.01 12.15 
0.5 Mean 3.37 1259.97 148.35 1182.35 60.69 2464.74 
cv (%) 19.37 3.31 80.46 17.70 1.01 12.16 
1.0 Mean 3.06 1282.80 147.83 1190.17 61.50 2478.13 
cv (%) 18.28 3.16 81.76 17.61 1.11 12.31 
"Elasticity parameters are identical for both the US and the EU and change simultaneously in both the regions; elasticity of demand in RW 
is held constant at -0.31. 
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A more liberalized market is generally associated with higher elasticities. The results of 
this study suggest that a more liberalized global economy will face lower price variability, 
reducing the need for buffer stocks. Freer markets also encourage more trade and that trade is 
less volatile. The CV of consumption increases modestly in more open economies (Table 7). 
Sensitivity to Elasticity of Supply 
Rational stockholders carry forward less stock if they expect producers to increase 
production in response to higher prices; rational producers respond to future production 
uncertainties by adjusting the planting area. The supply elasticity determines the degree of 
flexibility that farmers have in responding to future expectations. A more flexible supply 
response substitutes for grain stocks. Thus, as the supply elasticity increases, storage becomes 
less important as responsive production complements storage in stabilizing prices and 
consumption. 
The CV of price and consumption declines marginally as the elasticity of supply is 
increased from 0.1 to 1.0 (Table 7). The decline in steady state mean stockholding is small. 
The conclusion from Table 7 is that means and CV of key variables are not highly responsive 
to changes in demand and supply elasticities within the ranges examined. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study developed a structural model of the world wheat market consisting of the US, 
the EU, and a combined rest-of-the-world. The model assesses domestic and international 
linkages in buffer stockholdings and trade of wheat in an efficient, integrated global economy 
characterized by stochastic production in the US and the EU. RW is represented by a stochastic 
net demand function which accounts for both stochastic production and stochastic consumption 
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in RW. The rational expectations framework was used to incorporate the effects of future 
uncertainty on stockholding behavior and on market prices. The major findings of this study 
are summarized below. 
First, the results of the present study suggest an optimal wheat buffer stock level of 150 
million bushels in the US if the coefficient of variation in production is 10 percent and discount 
factor is 7 percent in both the US and in the EU. This level will change depending on the 
domestic and foreign level of production instability, supply, interest rates, government 
commodity programs, and foreign stockholdings. Adding pipeline stocks of 250 million bushels 
still leaves optimal US carryover stocks of 400 million bushels, well below stock levels of the 
1950s and 1960s under commodity programs. However, the optimal buffer stock level increases 
to 262 million bushels if the discount factor is reduced to zero and CV of production is increased 
to 15 percent, which is approximately equal to the actual level of stocks held by the US in recent 
years (when pipeline stocks are added) but much lower than stocks of the 1950s and 1960s. So 
it is possible to rationalize the recent levels of buffer stocks but not those of the 1950s and 1960s 
held for extended periods with help from the CCC. Reliance on private stocks alone is likely 
to result in more efficient buffer reserve levels than did past government stockholdings. 
Second, higher US interest rates reduce optimal US wheat buffer stocks but could be 
compensated by the increased stock levels in the EU. Results predict that for every bushel 
decrease in US stocks, the EU will increase its stocks by 0.4 bushels. 
Third, results indicate that elimination of the Export Enhancement Program by the US 
and export restitution payments by the EU is unlikely to have a major impact on wheat exports 
from the two regions, but will save millions of dollars to taxpayers in both the regions. Any 
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decrease in exports is unlikely to markedly reduce market prices in the US because in the short 
run a large part of reduced exports will be held as stocks. 
Fourth, each $1 cut from EEP on average would reduce US wheat producers' net income 
by an estimated $0.69 to $0.84 while raising the real income of consumers by $0.34 to $0.41 
and real national income by $0.58 to $0.65. Thus direct payments to producers would be more 
cost effective means than EEP to raise US farm income. 
The EU has held large stocks of wheat in some recent years. But policy reforms of the 
EU as well as the US have attempted to reduce wheat stocks. Global wheat stocks at the end 
of the 1995/96 marketing year are expected to set record lows for recent decades. The private 
sector is unlikely to hold much buffer stocks because the stockholding and marketing intentions 
of the US and EU public sectors are unclear. Thus during the precarious transition currently 
underway to a more market oriented agriculture and liberalized trade, the government may need 
to hold at least a modest size emergency wheat reserve to provide a backup to private 
stockholding. 
It is possible that risk neutrality and other assumptions of this model do not hold in 
reality. If consumers are highly risk averse, then the private sector alone will not provide 
adequate wheat reserve stocks. Other shortcomings of the model include failure to endogenize 
related sectors such as rice and coarse grains, and to account for other wheat producing nations 
such as those in the southern hemisphere diminishing the need for US stocks. 
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